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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GEORGE H. STEVENS, et al, ~~ 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
\ 
I 
vs. 
RALPH C. MEMMOIT, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
I 
CASE 
NO. 8700 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In studying this brief, plaintiffs respectfully request 
the Oourt to refer constantly to Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11, 
and Defendants' Exhibit No. 10, which are illustrations 
of the numerous claims in issue which will enable the COurt 
to visualize the issues invo!Lved. 
Plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to cer-
tain placer mining claims located about 8 miles west of 
Fillmore, Utah, whose principal value is that of volcanic 
ash and cinders wruoh is primarily used to make building 
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QlOCks, poultry liter, and insulation. The plaintiffs brought 
em action to quiet title to these certain :minmg claims which 
are in direct conflict with those claimed by the defendan-ts. 
Plaintiffs' appeal from the judgment of the lower court as 
to their placer mining claims known as Drake 1, Drake 8, 
Red Robin, and Red Robin A claims which, respectively, 
are in direct conflict with the defendants' claims known as 
Cinder Crater 14, Cinder Crater 13, and Red Hill No.1. 
Prior to the location of the above claims by either party 
herein, certain mining claims known as Black Dragon Nos. 
4, 5 and 6 were validly located on the same grotmd at issue. 
These claims were all located October 27 and 28, · 1937 
(Defendants' Exhibit 58). Plaintiff Von Utley was pres-
ent at the time these claims were located; he performed 
some of the work in building the discovery monuments 
and the corner monuments to locate said claims. At the 
request of one of these original locators, to-wit, Vern Smith, 
Mr. Utley placed the location notice of Black Dragon No. 
5 in the discovery monument after Mr. Utley witnessed 
Mr. Smith fill said location notice out, at the direction of 
Mr. Smith (Tr. 133). The notice of location for Black 
Dragon No. 5 is that of a metes and bounds description 
commencing at the discovery monument (Defendants' Ex-
h~bit 58, page 5). The annual assessment work was per-
formed on the Black Dragon Claims Nos. 1-6 each year 1n 
and including June 30, 1942 (Defendants' Exhibit 58). 
That subsequent to June 30, 1942, to and including June 
30, 1947, the original locators and their successors in in-
terest filed Notices of Intention to Hold instead of per-
forming the annual labor on Black Dragon Claims 1 through 
5 in accordance with the Congressional Act authorizing the 
suspension of annual labor on mining claims during the 
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war. The Congressional Act is thart: of H. R. 2370 Bill ap-
proved May 3, 1943 (Defendants' Exhibit 58). The last 
Notice of Intention to Hold ~iled for Black Dragon 6 was 
for the assessment year July 1, 1941, to July 1, 1942. 
Defendants located their Cinder Crater Claims as fol-
lows: 
Cinder Crater 5, March 5, 1947 (Answer and Counter-
claim) 
Cinder Crater 13, July 28, 1947 (Defendants' No. 3) 
Cinder Crater 14, July 28, 1947 (Defendants' No. 2) 
AT THE TIME OF THE LOCATION OF CINDER 
CRATER NOS. 5, 13, AND 14, THE BLACK DRAGON 
CLAIMS 1 THROUGH 5 WERE VALID MINING CLAIMS 
IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT, AND DEFENDANTS 
CLAIM CINDER CRATER NO. 14 WAS NOT A VALID 
LOCATION IN TH~T THERE WAS AN EXISTING 
VALID MINING CLAIM ON THE SAME GROUND. 
The following is a chart summarizing the mining claims 
in di:root conflict of the respective parties herein and the 
times of their location in order of the date of their location: 
Black Dragon No. 4-Located 10-27-37 by Plaintiffs' prede-
cessor in title, annual notices filed until 7-1-48. 
Defendants' Oinder Crater No. 5----Located 3-5-47. 
Plaintiffs' Red Rolbin-Looa.ted 6-22-50 and Red Robin A 
located 1-22-53. 
Defendants' Red Hill No. 1-Looa!ted 9-27-56-after suit 
commenced. 
Black Dragon No. 5----Located 10-28-37-Annual notires 
filed until 7-1-48. 
Defendants' Cinder Cmter No. 14-Located 7-28-47. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Plaintiffs' Drake No. 1-Locat.ed 7-8-52, and Plaintiffs' 
Drake No. 8, loca.rted 7-14-55. 
Black Dragon No. 6--Located 10-29-37. 
Amended 6-29-39, and increased in size to include B1ack 
Dragon No. 5. 
Annual Notices filed until 7-1-42. 
Defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14-Located 7-28-47. 
Plaintiffs' Drake No. 1-I...ocated 7-8-52. 
Plaintiffs' D·rake No. 8-Located 7-14-55. 
During the course of the pre-trials of 1Jhis case, it was 
conceded by defendants that their claim Cinder Crater No. 
5 was not a valid claim for the reason that they located 
their claim at a time when Black Dragon No. 4 was a valid 
mining claim in force and effect upon the same gi'OlD1d. 
With full klnowledge of plaintiffs' claim to this ground and 
after suit was commenced, defendants top filed defendants' 
Red Robin and Red Robin A claims with their claim Red 
Hill No. 1 on 9-7-56 (Defendants' Exhibit No. 10). 
Prior to the location of Red Hill No. 1 by defendants, 
plaintiffs had been mining the same ground, their claim 
knmm as Red Robin A (Tr. 111) (Tr. 214, 215). 
The uncontradicted evidence discloses that plaintiff 
Von Utley was present at the time the old mining claim 
Black Dragon No. 5 was located and assisted in its loca-
tion; that he knows the exact location of said claim which 
is described by metes and bounds description (Tr. 133); 
that Mr. Utley used the same monuments as the old Black 
Dragon No. 5 in locating his claim Drake No. 1 (Tr. 174, 
175). Mr. Shelton, a mining engineer and licensed surveyor, 
discovered the original Notice of Location of the Black 
Dragon No. 5 in a monumenrt located on the Plaintiffs' claim 
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Drake No. 1 and No. 8 (Tr. 90). That the mining claim 
Black Dragon No.5 was in force and effect at the time de-
fendants located their Cinder Crater No. 14 (Defendants' 
E)Ch.ibit 58); that Black Dragon No. 6 was in force and ef-
fect at the time defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was lo-
cated, whioh invalidated defendants' location of Cinder Cra-
ter No. 14 and left the ground open for plaintiffs to locate 
their Drake No. 1 and Drake No. 8 upon the same ground 
(Derfendanrts' Exhibit 58, Defendants' Exhibit 11, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 10). The jury found that the defendant had con-
structed a road for his assessment work for the year end-
ing July 1, 1952 and July 1, 1953, as illustrated by a red 
pencil line on Defendants' Exhibit 11, between the letters 
B and C on said exhibit (Tr. 288). That it required 11/2 
days work to construct the road between the letters B and 
C as illustrated on Defendants' Exhibit 11 (Tr. 290). The 
area in which defendants claim the road was built near the 
south boundary orf their Cinder Crater 13 was an area in 
which defendants had no valid claim whatsoever; that it 
belonged to a third party, and the Distriot Court for Millard 
County rules that defendants did not have title to the area 
in which the road was built >and never had title to said 
ground (Tr. 263). Assuming that defendants did build this 
road, which plaintiffs claim is fictitious and physically im-
possible to build in the area it was testified to have been 
built, and in tJhe manner it was said to have been built, the 
derfendanrts did build the alleged road on someone else's 
claims, for which they may not claim credit as assessment 
work on their own claims. The jury found that this road, 
which is alleged to have been built in 1 Y2 days by defendant 
was valued at $112.00 (Special Interrogatories). That a 
portion of the alleged road was builrt upon defendants' Cin-
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der Crater 14, which would make defendants' assessment 
work for Cinder Crater 14 for the assessment year ending 
July 1, 1949, and determines whether or not Cinder Crater 
13 was valid or not at the time Red Robin claim of plaintiffS 
was located by plaffitiffs. It is apparent that $112.00 worth 
of assessment work is not sufficient work for three claims 
that defendants claim, when the said claims are not con-
tiguous. The area in which defendants claim to have built 
the alleged road is an area where there are large volcanic 
rock formations, which would be a physical ~ility for 
defendants to build such a road in the manner they de-
scribed; that once a road is made it is ascertainable for many 
years afterward for the reason that the 1xlp soil is disturbed 
and the brush will not grow back, leaving it free from brush; 
that a person could not even ride a horse through that area, 
let alone drive a tractor (Tr. 318, 320, 325). There never 
was a road in the area that defendants illustrated on De-
fendants' Exhibit 11 on that portion of the :road allegedly 
built on defendants' Cinder Crater 14 (Tr. 352, proposed 
exhibit of surveyor's map, which was not allowed in evi-
dence, Tr. 34, Tr. 343). 
There was no evidence of a road on plaintiffs' Drake 
No. 1 and Drake No. 8, as described by defendants on De-
fendants' Exhibit No. 11 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit No.. 29) 
which is the area that defendant alleges road W'aS built 
clearly discloses that there was no road there at the time 
plaintiffs worked this area, and that defendants did not 
strip the overburden off the area he testified to, to-wit, the 
southeast corner of Drake No. 1. See also the surveyor's 
map whioh court refused to allow jury to see or take 1D the 
jury room. 
Plai.nrtiffs' ExhiJbtt 27 clearly illustrates that it was 
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plaintiff who stripped the ove~burden off; the tracks are 
those of the plaintiff's tractor in the photograph. 
The defendants testified thiat they removed overburden 
in the southeast corner of Drake No. 1 for their assessment 
work for July 1, 1951, to July 1, 1952 (Tr. 229). Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit No. 29 clearly illustrates that the overburden in 
the southwest corner of Drake No. 1 was not stripped as 
defendants testified; that at the time plaintiffs commenced 
work in 1956 in this area, it was not disturbed by defend-
ants or anyone else. Surveyor's map not admitted illus-
trates no such work 'as described by defendants in southwest 
corner of Drake No. 1. 
At a hearing for a preliminary injunction, held May 8, 
1956, the defendant Ralph Memmott testified that he knew 
the plaintiff Mr. Utley had a claim known as Drake No. 3 
at the time he top filed this claim with his claim known as 
Black Lava No. 1, which he located April 2, 1956, after 
suit commenced. The excuse used hy defendant Ralph 
Memmott was that he checked the records to see if he could 
locate the claim by .fue records; then if he couldn't he would 
top file the claim; that if there was nothing on rthe records 
to satisfy him, he would then proceed to file (Pg. 68, 69, 70, 
71, Transcript of the Preliminary Hewing). Yet the de-
fendant Ralph Memmott had actual knowledge of this claim 
and Where it was looated; and the lower court so found (see 
Memorandum Decision Par. 5). It is apparent from the 
record that defendants habitually jwnp claims whenever 
he is not satisfied with the public record, and with no re-
gard to the actual or physical condition of the claims with 
reference to work done or staking; they rely entirely upon 
the lack of a surveyed description of record, not by physi-
cal inspection of the property. Whenever Mr. Ralph Mem-
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mott sees that someone has located a sizealble deposit of 
cinders, he immediately goes to the record to see if irt satis-
fies him as to its proper location. H the record does not 
~atisfy him, he then jumps the claim by filing for record 
He admits that the cnly knowledge he has is that of record; 
without any regard as to what he knows by a physical in-
spection. There is no valid claim until it is recorded, in 
the opinion of Mr. Memmott (Tr. 275). During the depo-
sition of Mr. Ralph Memmott, taken in April, 1956, he spe-
cifically admitted that he did not claim any interest in the 
plaintiffs' claim Drake No. 3, as was illustrated on defend-
ants' map then before him at that time (Tr. 270). 
At the several pre-trials held on this case, the purpose 
was an attempt to simplify the issues and to limit them. 
At these pre-trials and depositions it was detennined that 
two of the claims, Red Robin A and Drake No. 3, belonging 
to plaintiffs, would not be issues for the reason that defend-
ants then had no valid interest in said claims. Since com-
mencement of suit defendants jumped both of these claims, 
and brought them right back into issue, and by so doing 
succeeded in confusing and increasing the heretofore sim-
plified issues. This certainly defeats the purpose of the 
pre-trial procedure. 
There was a conflict in the evidence as to which of 
the parties performed the annual labor on the claims in 
issue, and the places where the work was claimed to have 
been done. But the vast preponderance of the evidence 
was in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. 
The only witness the defendants produced was one of the 
defendants himself, Mr. Ralph Memmott, who is a vitally 
interested party. The plainrtiffs produced disinterested wit-
nesses who had no interest in the outcome of the trial, to-
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Mt: Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining 
engineer; Mr. Culbert Robison, a poliee officer for the city 
of Fillmore, Utah; Mr. Lowell Peterson, a garage mechanic 
and truck driver, together wiith interested parties such as 
Mr. George H. Stevens, Mr. VonUtley, and Mrs. Von Utley, 
all of whom are parties to this action. 
There are a number of discrepancies of defendant's testi-
mony. He relates in the Hearing for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion that he shipped cinders from his Cinder Crater No. 
14, and has not shipped from Cinder Crater No. 5 (Page 
20 of said Transcript). On the deposition of Mr. Ralph 
Memmott, he testified that he had nort shipped cinders 
from either Cinder Crater No. 13 or No. 14, but did ship 
several loads from Cinder Crater No. 5 (Page 12 and 13 
of his Deposition). 
Mr. Memmott testified at the trial that Mr. Utley was 
mining in the area in which defendant had removed the 
overburden from (Tr. 236). Plaintiffs' E)ffiibit 29 clearly 
shows that the spot which plaintiff has now mined in Drake 
No. 1 and No. 8, was not stripped as Mr. Memmott testi-
fied it was. This photograph was taken prior to the time 
the same area was ~mined by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs submit 
that defendant Mr. Ralph Memmott is guilty of perjuring 
his testimony before this Court on these matters, and should 
not be allowed to prevail on any issues by reason of the 
said perjury. 
In addition to the above perjured testimony, Mr. Ralph 
Memmott testified rt;hat on his deposition that his Cinder 
Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 are both contiguous (Page 
10, Memmott Deposition). That the record dearly shows 
that Mr. Mem~mott did not own the vast majority of the 
alleged Cinder Crater No. 13 claim, forr the reason that it 
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had always belonged to another party, and the defendants' 
Cinder Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 have never been 
contiguous (Tr. 263, 264). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFEND-
~S TO AMEND THEm SECOND AMENDED ANS-
WER AND COUNTERCLAIM SO AS TO BRING BE-
FORE THE JURY THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
RED ROBIN A WinCH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AD-
MI'I*I'ED VALID IN PRE-TRIAL; BY REASON OF DE-
FENDANTS' TOP FILING PLAINTIFFS' RED ROBIN 
A AFTER SUIT HAD CO:MMENCED; RIGHrrS TO BE 
DETERMINED WERE THE RIGHTS THAT EXISTED 
AT TIME SUIT WAS COMMENCED. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFEND-
ANTS TO AMEND THEIR SEXX>ND AMENDED ANS-
WER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BRING BEFORE THE 
COURT THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE 
NO. 3 AND DEFENDANTS' CLAIM BLACK LA VA NO. 
1 WHICH WAS LOCATED BY DEFENDANTS ON TOP 
OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM AFTER THE LAW SUIT WAS 
COMMENCED AND WHEN DEFENDANTS HAD AC-
TUAL KNOWLEOOE OF PLAINTIFFS' VALID CLAIM. 
POINT m 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER- AND 
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PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT TO PUT BE-
FORE THE COURT AND JURY THE ISSUE OF THE 
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE BLACK DRAGON NO. 
5 MINING CLAIM; THAT IT WAS IN FORCE AND EF-
FECT AT THE TIME DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR 
CINDER CRATER NO. 14 CLAIM; THAT CINDER CRA-
TER NO. 14 WAS THEREFORE INVALID AT THE 
TIME PLAINTIFFS LOCATED THEIR DRAKE NO. 
1 AND NO.8. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
MAKE A FINDING OF FACT AS TO THE PHYSI-
CAL LOCATION OF BLACK DRAGON NO. 5 AND 
THAT THE UNCONTROVERTED EWDENCE WAS TO 
THE EFFECr THAT BLACK DRAGON NO.5 WAS THE 
SAME PHYSICAL LOCATION OF CINDER CRATER 
NO. 14; THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE NO. 1 AND 
NO. 8 WERE VALID BECAUSE OF THE INVALIDITY 
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO IN-
STRUCT JURY UPON TilE UNCONTROVERTED EVI-
DENCE THIAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT LABOR PER-
FOR!MED ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM RED ROBIN A 
DURING THE SPRING OF 1956, PRIOR TO THE LO-
CATION OF DEFENDANTS' CLAIM RED HILL NO. 1. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
INTO EVIDENCE AS AN EXHIBIT THE SURVEYOR'S 
MAP MADE BY MR. A. R. SHELTON, ll..LUSTRATING 
THE CLAIMS IN ISSUE AND THE WORKINGS AND 
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IMPROVEMENTS ON THE SAME CLAIMS AS OF THE 
DATE OF THE SURVEY. THE COURT ERRED BY UN-
DUE INTERFERENCE WITHJ THE DIRECT EXAMINA-
TION OF MR. A. R. SHELTON WHICH DISCREDITED 
THE WITNESS IN THE EYES OF THE JURY. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BLACK 
DRAGON CLAIM NO.6 WAS INVALID AT THE TIME 
DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR CLAIM CINDER 
CRATER NO. 14 BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF 
THE OWNERS OF SAID BLACK DRAGON NO. 6 TO 
FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF LABOR OR A NOTICE OF 
INTENTION TO HOLD FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 
ENDING JULY 1, 1947, OR BETWEEN JULY 1, 1947, 
AND JULY 23, 1947, THE DATE OF THE LOCATION 
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14 BY DEFENDANTS. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR EITHER THE COURT OR THE 
JURY TO VIEW THE PREMISES EITHER AS TO ALL 
THE CLAIMS IN DISPUTE OR AS TO CINDER CRA-
TER NO. 13, NO. 14, DRAKE NO. 1 AND NO. 8. 
POINT VITI 
DEFENDANTS WILFULLY MISREPRESENTED 
MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO ASSESSMENT 
WORK ON THE CLAIMS CINDER CRATER NO. 13 
AND NO. 14; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY UPON THE PREPONDERANCE 
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OF THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS ON 
THE ISSUES OF THE CLAIMS RED ROBIN A, RED 
ROBIN, DRAKE NO. 1 AND DRAKE NO. 8. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFEND-
ANTS TO AMEND THEIR SEOOND AMENDED ANS-
WER AND COUNTERCLAIM SO AS TO BRING BE-
FORE THE JURY THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
RED ROBIN A WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN AD-
MITTED VALID IN PRE-TRIAL; BY REASON OF DE-
FENDANTS' TOP FILING PLAINTIFFS' RED ROBIN 
A AFTER SUIT HAD COMMENCED; RIGHTS TO BE 
DETERMINED WERE THE RIGHTS THAT EXISTED 
AT TIME SUIT WAS COMMENCED. 
One of the main functions of a Pr~ Trial is to determine 
the issues of the case and to limit them as far as possible. 
'Dhe defendants conceded to plaintiffs at the first pr~ trial 
on this case that their old Cinder Crater No. 5, which was 
in direct conflict with plaintiffs' Red Robin A and Red Ro--
bin, was invalid for the reason that when Cinder Crater 
No. 5 was located, there was a valid claim in force and ef-
fect, namely, Black Dragon No. 4 (Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 58). 
'f.here must be an end to the issues of a case at one 
time or another, and the issues should be determined as of 
the date of the filing of the lawsuit and the commencement 
of the action as between the parties: to said action. In 
Healy vs. Rupp, 86 P. 1015, the Colorado Court ruled that 
in application for a patent to a mining dai,m, "the rights of 
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an adverse ·claimant to a mining location are limited to those 
existing at the time of the- filing of his adverse (claim) so 
that he is not entitled to urge a subsequent discovery for 
the purpose of preventing the issuance of a patent to the 
applicant." On page 1017, the Colorado Court states: 
"if he had no claim art: the time of filing the adverse, he 
will not be heard to assert right to premises in dispute 
by virtue of one brought into existence thereafter." 
78-40-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is as follows: 
"TerminaJtion of title pending action If plaintiff 
shows right to recover at time the action was com-
menced, but it appears that his right has terminated 
during pendency of action, the verdict and judgment 
must be according to the fact, and plaintiff may re-
cover damages for withholding the property." 
It is clear that the Utah Legislature intended that the 
status quo be maintained by parties to an action during the 
pendency of a quiet title action. Certainly if this were not 
the case, there might not be an end to the oontroversy be-
tween the parties. 
7 4 C. J. S. 145. Quiet Title No. 95. 
"The decree must be confined to a determination 
and adjustment of existing rights in particular prop-
erty in controversy." 
In Alwnan vs. Hoofer (Wash.) 1905, 79 P. 953, the 
court holds as follows: 
"Where, immediately after a judgment in an ac-
tion to recover possession of certain mining claims, 
finding that neither of the parties had any possessory 
rights in the claims in question, plaintiffs in that ac-
tion relocated the claims, and thereafter did the re-
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quired assessment work thereon, finding that such re-
locations were made on WlOCCUpied public land, as re-
quired by law, was proper." 
The rights existing at the time of the commencement 
of the action are those thart: are determinative as between 
tJhe parties. There was certainly lack of good faith on the 
part of defendants to cloud the issues and expand them 
after pre-trial. The uncontroverted testimony was thalt 
plaintiffs were not only doing their assessment work, (mini-
mum of $112.00 for Red Robin A) , but that they were min-
ing the property. Pursuant to the granting of an injunc-
tion to defendants prohibiting plaintiffs from working the 
claim Red Robin A, plaintiffs discontinued working this 
claim and moved onto their Red Robin claim. Certainly 
defendants are estopped from jumping plaintiffs' claim 
under these circumstances. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFEND-
ANTS TO AMEND THEIR SECOND AMENDED ANS-
WER AND COUNTERCLAIM TO BRING BEFORE THE 
COURT THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE 
NO.3 AND iDEFENDANTS' CLAIM BLACK LAVA NO. 
1 WHICH WAS LOCATED BY DEFENDANTS ON TOP 
OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM AFfER THE LAW SUIT WAS 
COMMENCED AND WHEN DEFENDANTS HAD AC-
TUAL KNOWLEOOE OF PLAINTIFFS' VALID CLAIM. 
Although the jury and the court righ1fully awarded 
Drake No. 3 to the plaintiffs, it was error for the court to 
even allow the issue to come before the court during the 
trial of :the case. The basis for the defendant's claim jump-
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ing was that he claimed he did not know the location of 
plaintiffs' claim Drake No. 3 when it was not recorded in 
county records in legal subdivisions. The court found 
that defendant had actual knowledge of Drake No. 3, its 
surveyed description by legal subdivisions prior to the time 
that defendant filed Black Lava No.1. In fact, Mr. Ralph 
Memmott~ defendant, is guilty of perjury on this point. 
He admitted he claimed no interst in Drake No. 3 (Tr. 
270, 275). 
The error consisted of allowing 'another issue ,before the 
jury which did certainly confuse the jury in the lawsuit, in 
that a great deal of additional evidence was required to dis-
prove defendants' claim to Drake No. 3, and set up a con-
dition for the jtlry to compromise in awarding the claims 
herein; that the jury compromised and gave Drake No. 3 
to plaintiffs, when they were entitled to said claim unques-
tionably. 
POINT ill 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER AND 
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT TO PUT BE-
FORE THE COURT AND JURY THE ISSUE OF THE 
PHYSICAL LOCATION OF THE BLACK DRAGON NO. 
5 MINING CLAIM; THAT IT WAS IN FORCE AND EF-
FECT AT THE TIME DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR 
CINDER CRATER NO. 14 CLAIM; THAT CINDER CRA-
TER NO. 14 WAS THEREFORE INVALID AT THE 
TIME PLAINTIFFS LOCATED THEIR DRAKE NO. 
1 AND NO.8. THE COURT ERREID IN FAILING TO 
MAKE A FINDING OF FACT AS TO THE PHYSI-
CAL LOCATION OF BLACK DRAGON NO. 5 AND 
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THAT THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE WAS TO 
THE EFFECf THAT BLACK DRAGON NO.5 WAS THE 
SAME PHYSICAL LOCATION OF CINDER CRATER 
NO. 14; THAT PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM DRAKE NO. 1 AND 
NO. 8 WERE VALID BECAUSE OF THE INVALIDITY 
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14. 
The mining daim Black Dragon No.5 was located 10-
28-37, and was in force and effeot until 7-1-48. The de-
~cription of said daim was not a surveyed description in a 
legal subdivision, hurt a metes and bounds description from 
a rock monument (Defendants' Exhibit 38). The physical 
location of this daim was vital to determine whether or nort 
defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was valid, for if Black 
Dragon No. 5 was on the same ground as Cinder Crater 
No. 14 and Black Dragon No. 5 was in force and effect .at 
the time defendants located Cinder Crater No. 14 (7-28-47), 
then defendants' Cinder Crater No. 14 is invalid. ~he un-
controverted testimony was to the effect that Black Dragon 
No. 5 was located on the same ground that plaintiffs loca-
ted their Drake No. 1 and Drake No. 8 (Tr. 61, 90, 133, 
17 4, 175) . Mr. Shelton found original Notice of Location 
of Black Dragon No. 5 in monument near Southwesrt corner 
of Drake No. 1 (Tr. 61, 89, 90). 
The court's reason for its refusal to allow plaintiffs' 
motion was because the court claimed the defendant had 
not had knowledge of this contention by plaintiff, and that 
it would be inequitable for defendants to face this issue at 
such a late date (Tr. 144). The defendant served Inter-
rogatories upon plaintiffs inquiring into this issue even b~ 
fore pre-trial. In their Answer to the Interrogatories, plain-
tiffs expressly placed defendants upon notice of their con-
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tention that Black Dragon No. 5 and Black Dragon No. 6 
were one and tlhe same claims. In Answer One, plaintiffs 
notified defendants that plaintiffs claimed title to Black 
Dragon No. 5 through relocation of the same claim by 1heir 
claims Drake No.1 and Drake No.8. (See Answers to In-
terrogatories). On the same basis, the court allowed de-
fendants to Amend the Pre-Trial Order and Answer and 
Counterclaim (Tr. 2, 3) (Tr. 294). It was certainly unjust 
and inequitable to allow defendants to amend at such a 
time rand then not allow plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the 
Complaint and Pre-Trial Order (Tr. 140-143). It was error 
for the court to refuse such a vital issue as to the location 
of Black Dragon No. 5 and the validity of Cinder Crater 
No. 14 at the time of its location. 
The court erred in failing to direct the jury as a mat-
ter of law that plaintiffs' Drake No.1 and No.8 were valid 
for tlle reason thaJt Black Dragon No. 5 was in force and 
effect when defendants located Cinder Crater No. 14; that 
the uncontroverted evidence was to this effect. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO IN-
STRUCf JURY UPON THE UNCONTROVERTED EV1J-
DENCE THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT LABOR PER-
FOR!MED ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM RED ROBIN A 
DURING THE SPRING OF 1956, PRIOR TO THE LO-
CATION OF DEFENDANTS' CLAIM RED HILL NO.1. 
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiffs had actual 
possession of their claims Red Robin and Red Robin A and 
had performed their assessment work for the current year 
at the time defendants located their Red Hill No. 1 (Tr. 111, 
214, 215, 218, 349). Plaintiffs moved off Red Robin A in 
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1956 due to Temporary Injunction obtained by defendants 
and granted by the court (Temporary Injunction). Mr. 
Ralph Memmott admitted that he saw plaintiffs working 
their Red Robin A in May, 1956, and that the value of said 
work was worth $32.00 (Tr. 218). Mrs. Utley's uncontra-
dicted evidence was to the effect that a large truck and 
driver were hired for two days at the rate of $40.00 per day 
to perform assessment work on Red Robin A, and produced 
a photograph of the truck used for this purpose (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 61) (Tr. 349). This made a total valuation of the 
assessment work for Red Robin A of $112.00, which is un-
contradicted. 
Mr. Von Utley testified that he had built a ramp on 
Red Robin A during the spring of 1956, in order that he 
could load cinders from that claim and ship them (Tr. 106). 
That he shipped cinders from Red Robin A, one railroad 
car, oo April17, 1956; that he had to rebuild the first ramp 
after some unknown person destr~ed it beyond use (Tr. 
109,111). That evidently someone did not want 'him to 
work the claim and ship cinders from it. Plaintiffs moved 
from their mining operation on Red Robin A at the instance 
of the ~urt order obtained by the defendants in May, 1956, 
prior to the time defendants located their Red Hill No. 1, 
and at a time when defendants did not have any valid claim 
on the property (Tr. 214, 215). The uncontradicted evi-
dence was to the effect that during the months of Febru-
ary, May and June, 1956, plaintiffs performed a minimtun 
of $112.00 work for the annual labor of Red Robin A in 
addition to actually mining the claim (Tr. 218, 349) (Plain-
tilffs' Exhibit 61). 
That pursuant to an Injunction from this Court at the 
request of the defendants, Mr. Utley moved off Red Robin 
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A and went on to Red Robin to continue working and min-
ing (Tr. 113). Under a fact situation such as this, the de-
fendants should certainly be estopped from claiming no 
work done on Red Robin A, when they were instrumental 
in seeing that plaintiffs moved off from Red Robin A. 
The evidence is clear that more than enough work was 
done on Red Robin A during the spring of 1956 to comply 
with the legal requirements. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
INTO EVIDENCE AS AN EXIITBIT THE SURVEYOR'S 
MAP MADE BY MR. A. R. SHELTON, ~LUSTRATING 
THE CLAIMS IN ISSUE AND THE WORKINGS AND 
IMPROVEMENTS ON THE SAME CLAIMS AS OF THE 
DATE OF THE SURVEY. THE COURT ERRED BY UN-
DUE INTERFERENCE WITH THE DIRECT EXAMINA-
TION OF MR. A. R. SHELTON WHICH DISCREDITED 
THE WITNESS IN THE EYES OF THE JURY. 
Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining 
engineer, performed a survey of all of the plaintiffs' claims 
at issue before the Court October 13, 1955, and completed 
October 16, 1955 (Tr. 26). Mr. Shelton made a survey 
map upon which he drew the results of his examination 
of the claims at the time the survey was ·made, and recorded 
the monuments, diggings, workings, roads, and objects he 
observed in his thorough examination of plaintiffs' claims, 
and ties the claims into governmental survey in the area. 
He produced this map on the witness stand, and it was of-
fered in evidence both at pre-trial and during the trial it-
self (Tr. 27, 34). The court refused to allow or did not 
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allow said survey map into evidence upon the reasoning 
that it kept reminding the jury of his testimony. Counsel 
for plaintiffs offered map into evidence before the contents 
of it were disclosed and after a basis of identification a:nd 
authenticity was made (Tr. 34). Plaintiffs submit that 
such a map is certainly admissible as an exhibit. 3 Nichols 
Applied Evidence 2975, No. 7 is as follows: 
"Maps are admissible in proper oase to illustrate 
the testimony of a witness oT as independent evidence. 
A map or chart may be admitted for explanatory use 
in connection with the testimony of a witness, although 
it would not be admissible as independent evidence." 
Certainly this is authority for alloiWing such an au-
thenticated survey map, made by a registered surveyor and 
mining engineer, both as an independent exhibit and for 
the purpose of illustrating the testimony of the surveyor. 
The jury certainly could not possibly remember all of the 
measurements and locations of the numerous claims at is-
sue at the trial. They were entitled to have the map to re-
fresh their memory as to his prolonged and detailed testi-
mony. The map expressly vefutes the testimony of de-
fendants as to where defendants performed their alleged 
assessment work. It expressly refutes the issue presented 
to the jury as to whether or not Mr. Memmott constructed 
that ce,rtain road for his assessment work in 1949. It ex-
pressly refutes the testimony of Mr. Ralph Memmott that 
he performed assessment work in the southwest corner of 
Drake No.1 and No.8 during the years 1952 and 1953; the 
same identical place that Mr. Von Utley had mined cinders 
in 1956. This was prejudicial error to plaintiffs in refusing 
said maJp as an exhibit for the use and benefit of the jw-y. 
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In the direct examination of Mr. Shelton, the licensed 
surveyor and mining engineer, the court interfered with 1Jhe 
examination to the point where the jury discredited the 
testimony of tJhis very important and disinterested witness. 
The court interrupted questions and answers posed, and led 
the jury to believe that the court was hostile to the witness 
(Tr. 29, lines 19 to 24 of Tr. 30). The court refused to al-
low the witness to open up tlle map fully for the reason that 
the jury might see the map (Tr. 28) . All of this together 
did discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BLACK 
DRAGON CLAIM NO.6 WAS INVALID AT THE TIME 
DEFENDANTS LOCATED THEIR CLAIM CINDER 
CRATER NO. 14 BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF 
THE OWNERS OF SAID BLACK DRAGON NO. 6 TO 
FILE AN AFFIDAVIT OF LABOR OR A NOTICE OF 
INTENTION TO HOLD FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 
ENDING JULY 1, 1947, OR BETWEEN JULY 1, 1947, 
AND JULY 23, 1947, TilE DATE OF THE LOCATION 
OF CINDER CRATER NO. 14 BY DEFENDANTS. 
The court did err if ruling as a matter of law that the 
ground covered by Black Dragon No. 6 became open to re-
location (Drake No. 1 and Cinder Crater No. 14), for the 
reason that neither an affidavit of labor or a Notice of In-
tention to Hold for the year 1947 was filed in the Recorder's 
Office of Millard County, During the war years of the 
Second World War, and to and subsequent to the year 1947, 
Congress exempted mining claims frQm annual labor. 
The apparent intention of Congress was to make those 
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mining claims then in force and effect valid, and to prevent 
their forfeiture for failure to perform annual labor during 
the war years to preserve the ,manpower of the nation and 
protect servicemen in the service. The Act directs that a 
Notice of Intention to Hold should be filed in the cOlUlty 
in which the elaim is located. Plaintiff submits that this 
Alct of Congress is nort mandatory. 
To make a legislative act mandatory, there must be a 
forfeiture provision in the act requiring a forfeiture. This 
Congressional Act does not do so. ':Dhere is no forfeiture 
provision in the Act, as there is in the Utah Statute re-
quiring annual labor. 
"It is a general rule of ccmstruction that where a 
legislative provision is accompanied by a penalty for 
a failure to observe it, the provision is mandatory." 
50 Am. Jur. 49, No. 27. 
The Act of suspension provided "that every claimant 
of any such mining daim, in order to obtain the benefits of 
this act shall file or cause to be filed, in the office where 
the location notice or certificate is recorded, on or before 
12 o'clock meridian, a notice of his desire to hold said min-
ing claim under this act . . . . . " 
The above act does not provide for any penalty of for-
feirture in the event the Notice of Intention to Hlo1d is not 
filed as is the ,case of the Statute providing for annual la-
bor. As a consequence, this Congressional act is not man-
datory, but is permissive. 
50 Am. Jur 53, No. 32, states as follows: 
"A legislative intention that the word 'shall', is to 
be construed as permissive, may appear from the spirit 
or purpose of the act, or from the connection in which 
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it is used or the relation into which it is put with other 
parts of the same statute." 
This statutory construction rule is·· suoh that the Con-
gressional Act suspending the work is permissive even 
though the word "shall" is used. It was the intention of 
Congress to preserve the status quo and to discontinue the 
necessity for work on claims. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
the case of Murray Hill Min. & Mill. Co. vs. Hanover, 66 
P. 762, has ruled that a claim on which the required im-
provements have been made and labor performed is not 
rendered open to re-location by failure to file an affidavit 
of labor and improvements as required by the Utah Stat-
ute, nor will such failure impair the right of the claimant 
to a patent. Every reasonable doubt will be resolved in 
favor of the validity of a mining claim as against assertion 
of a forfeiture. This same analogy should be carried to the 
filing of a Notice of Intention to Hold; that the work was 
· not necesary to be performed during the war years, and 
the mere failure to file the Notice of Intention to Hold does 
not forfeit a daim. 
In Cain vs. Addenda Mining Co., 15 ALR 942, the In-
terior Department of the U. S. A. held the suspension reso-
lution NOT MANDATORY. 
In Donoghue v. Tonopah Oriental Min. Co., Nevada, 198 
P. 553, 15 ALR 937, held that the failure to file notice of 
intention to take advantage of the resolution of Congress 
of 10-5-17, suspending assessment work on mining claims 
during the war, in the office where location notice was filed 
as required by the proviso of the Act, because of uncertainty 
as to County line and advice of County Officials that it 
should be filed in another county, where it was in fact filed, 
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does not render the 'Claim subject to relocation by another 
claimant; that where statute is susceptible of two interpr~ 
tations, that one will be given it which best enmports with 
reason and justice; that equity never enforces forfeitures, 
nor extends its aid in the assertion of a mere legal right 
contrary to clear equity and justice of the case; that there 
is no fnrfeiture where there is no fraud or deceit, no inten-
tinn to abandon, good faith and hnnest effort to comply, 
and excusable negleet, not attributed to owner. 
This case clearly illustrates that the filing of the No-
tice of Intention to Hold is not mandatory and does not cre-
ate a forfeiture, Plaintiffs submit; that the above elements 
for excusable neglect to file the Notice of Intention to Hold 
prevails in the instant ease; that Black Dragon No. 5 and 
No. 6 were overlapping claims, and Black Dragon No. 6 
included Black Dragon No.5, at least as far as the amend-
ment to Black Dragon Nn. 6 is concerned, which was done 
prior to the location of Cinder Crater No. 14 by defend-
ants; that Notice of Intention to Hold Black II)ragon No. 5 
was in fact filed which was for both Black Dragon No. 5 
and Black Dragon No. 6. Certainly this is one of the e~x­
ceptions that the authorities do and should recognize in the 
failure of owners to file Notice of Intention to Hold on Black 
Dragon No.6. 
In the case of Morgan vs. Sorenson, 286 P2d 229, Utah, 
1955, this Court discussed the aim of the assessment re-
quirement in that it was to develop the mineral reSOIUrces 
and encourage the mining of claims. In the instant case, 
it has been the plaintiffs that have been doing the mining 
and developing the resources. The plaintiffs have devel-
oped and mined their Drake No.1 and No.8 during the five 
years they have held the claim, while the defendants have 
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not mined or developed their Cinder Crater No. 13 or No. 
14 claims in the ten years they have claimed them; the PlU'-
pose of the law will be upheld by quieting title in the claims 
to plaintiffs, because plaintiffs have done and will continue 
to mine and develop these resources. 
In 15 ALR 942, the case of Royston vs. Miller is cited 
as follows: 
''The suspension of the provisions of the statute 
requiring annual work to be done n~y SUS-
PENDED TIIE RIGHT OF FORFEITURE. The for-
feiture imposed by the statute was for failing to do the 
work which the law then required to be done. 
"The suspendatory or amendatory act provided 
that the work hitherto required need not be done in 
[1893], and hence it follows that the right of forfeiture 
could not thereafter exist for any act omitted in that 
respect during that year. THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
A FORFEITURE CANNOT BE HAD WHEN THE 
LAW EXCUSES THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT 
CONDITION." 
The above clearly establishes the fact that these mora-
torium acts were intended to do away with the forfeiture 
provision in the law requiring the forfeiture of claims when 
annual work was not done. That the moratoriwn act for 
the year 1947 does not provide for a forfeiture of the claims 
in the event the Notice of Intention to Hold is not filed; 
hence the statute is not mandatory, but permissive and di-
rectory. The claim Black Dragon No. 6 was not forfeited 
for the reason that a Notice of Intention to Hold was not 
filed under its name just prior to the time defendants I~ 
cated Cinder Crater No. 14. Actually, a Notice of Inten-
tion to Hold was filed for Black Dragon No. 5 and No. 6 
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to 7-1-48; for the two claims at that time were merged into 
one another and the Notice To Hold was filed in the name 
of Black Dragon No. 5. 
POINT VII 
TilE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR EITHER THE COURT OR THE 
JURY TO VIEW THE PREMISES EITHER AS TO ALL 
THE CLAIMS IN DISPUTE OR AS TO CINDER CRA-
TER NO. 13, NO. 14, DRAKE NO. 1 AND NO. 8. 
Under Rule 47(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil ProcedUTe, 
the jury may be allowed to view the property which is the 
subject of litigation when in the opinion of the court it is 
proper for the jury to view the premises. Plaintiffs admit 
that this is within the discretion of the Court as to whether 
or not the jury or the Court should view the premises. In 
the case of P. A. Sorenson Co. vs. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 
Utah, 164 P. 1020, the Supreme Court of Utah states that 
the purpose of a view of the premises is to enable the jury 
to better understand and more fully appreciate the evidence 
produced in open court, and is not for the purpose of tak-
ing independent evidence. Plainiffs submit that a view in 
the instant case would have clarified a number of the issues 
before the jury when there were so many claims involved; 
that they could have dete,rmined by physical inspection 
whether or not the defendants could have ~constructed that 
certain road across Cinder Crater No. 14 and No. 13; that 
one look at the terrain would have convinced them that it 
would be impossible for the defendant to have constructed 
such a road in the time he testified he did (1lj2 days) across 
impassable terrain even for a horse. The jury was defi-
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nitely confused with the original issues and the additional 
issues defendants created during the course of the trial. 
A view of the premises for this purpose alone would have 
dispelled this one issue alone in favor of plaintiffs and would 
have proven beyond any doubt that Mr. Ralph Memmott 
had perjured himself before the court, and that the jury 
would then have resolved a minimum of one of the Special 
Interrogatories submitted to them in favor of the plain-
tiffs, but which they did not do so, to-wit: Was the road 
constructed by defendant and the amount which the road 
cost. It would have been impracticable to disprove this 
fictitious road any other way, except by testimony and a 
view of the premises. 
53 Am. Jur. 315, No. 442: 
"A view should not be granted unless it appears 
to be reasonably certain or the court is satisfied that 
it will be some aid to the jury in reaching their ver-
dict, and further, that it is distinctly impracticable 
and inefficient to present the material elements to them 
by photographs, diagrams, maps, measurements, and 
the like." 
If the court felt that it was too cumbersome to take 
the jury there, the court itself could have viewed the prem-
ises quickly and efficiently and determined once and for 
all whether Mr. Ralph Memmott had actually constructed 
the road he drew in red pencil across Defendants' Exhibit 
No. 11. 
The defendants objected to such a view, and apparently 
they were afraid of the results of such an inspection. 
Plaintiffs submit that this was a case in which the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to allow a view of the prem-
ises. 
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POINT VITI 
DEFENDANTS WILFULLY MISREPRESENTED 
MATERIAL FACTS RELATING TO ASSESSMENT 
WORK ON THE CLAIMS CINDER CRATER NO. 13 
AND NO. 14; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCf THE JURY UPON 'fHlE PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS ON 
THE ISSUES OF THE CLAIMS RED ROBIN A, RED 
ROBIN, DRAKE NO. 1 AND rrJRAKE NO. 8. 
The record is replete with intentional discrepancies in 
the testimony of Mr. Ralph Memmott. At a hearing for 
a preliminary injunction he stated that he had mined and 
shipped cinders from his Cinder Crater No. 14, and that he 
has not mined and shlpped cinders from Cinder Crater No. 
5 (Page 20 of that transcript). On his deposition, Mr. Mem-
mott testified that he had not shipped cinders from either 
Cinder Crater No. 13 or No. 14, but did ship from Cinder 
Crater No. 5 (Bages 12, 13 of deposition). 
Mr. Memmott testified at the trial that Mr. Utley 
was mining in the spot on Drake No. 1 ·and No. 8, in the 
southwest comer, where defendant had performed some 
of his assessment work in 1952 and 1953, removing over-
burden (Tr. 236). Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 29 clearly shows 
that the spot which plaintiff has now mined there was not 
stripped by defendant as he described it, or at all, by any-
one prior to the time that plaintiffs stripped the overburden 
off and mined it. This photograph was taken prior to the 
time the same area was mined by plaintiffs. Mr. Shelton's 
survey map, which was offered but not admitted in evi-
dence, clearly illustrates that there was no overbUTden 
stripped from this area in 1955 when he surveyed the claims 
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and made the map; Mr. Shelton so testified. Mr. Lowell 
Peterson, the truck driver, testified that the same spot had 
not been stripped as described by Mr. Memmott at a time 
when Mr. Peterson drove there to haul some cinders away 
from those claims for Mr. Utley. 
The red line on defendants' Exhibit 11, indicating a 
road Mr. Memmott allegedly built in 1949, is not disclosed 
on the survey map of Mr. Shelton (Tr. 34, 343). Mr. Low-
ell Peterson and Mr. Cul·bert Robison, the policeman, both 
testified that there was no such road on Drake No. 8 and 
that it would be physically impossible to build such a road 
in that area and in the time defendant alleged he built it 
(Tr. 318, 320, 325, 352). A view of the premises would 
have conclusively proved the road to be fictitious in the 
area it was drawn and the time and manner it was alleg--
edly built. 
Mr. Memmott testified that he did not know the where-
abouts or the existence of Drake No. 3 at the time he jumped 
this claim and filed his Black Lava No. 1 claim after this 
lawsuit had been commenced. The court found in its Judg-
ment and Findings of Fact and Law that Mr. Memmott had 
actual knowledge of plaintiffs' Drake No. 3, both as to its 
location and existence. 
Mr. Memmott testified on his deposition that his Cin-
der Crater claims No. 13 and No. 14 were both contiguous 
(Page 10, Memmott Deposition). The record clearly shows 
that Mr. Memmott did not own the vast majority of the al-
leged Cinder Crater No. 13 for the reason that it had al-
ways belonged to another party (Tr. 263, 264). 
It is clear at this point that Mr. Ralph Memmott has 
wilfully misrepresented the aJbove facts. That, in effect, 
he has purjured himself on the above points. He should 
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not be allowed to prevail on any issues based upon his mis-
represented evidence. 
There is a conflict in the evidence as to which of the 
parties performed the annual labor on claims in issue 
and the places where the work was claimed to have been 
done. But the vast preponderance of the evidence is in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The 
only witness the defendants produced was one of the de-
fendants himself, Mr. Ralph Memmott, who is a vitally in-
terested party. The plaintiffs produced disinterested wit-
nesses who had no interest in the outcome of the trial, .to-
wit: Mr. A. R. Shelton, a registered surveyor and mining 
engineer; Mr. Culbert Robison, a police officer for the city 
of Fillmore, Utah; Mr. Lowell Peterson, a garage mechanic 
and truck driver, together with interested parties such as 
Mr. George H. Stevens, Mr. and Mrs. Von Utley, all of whom 
are parties to this action. 
In view of this vast preponderance of evidence in favor 
of the plaint:iftis, the court should have pointed out and in-
structed the jury such a preponderance of the evidence. 
By reason of the intentional clouding and multiplying of the 
issues on the part of the defendant after suit was com-
menced, and the above mentionad wilful misrepresenta-
tions ·made by defendant, Mr. Ralph Memmott, the issues on 
appeal should now be resolved in favor of the plaintiff as 
to the plaintiffs' claims Red Robin A, Red Robin, Drake 
No. 1 and No. 8. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in allowing defendants to top file plain-
tiffs' Red Robin A ·and Drake No. 3 elaims after suit was 
commenced, to amend the pre-trial order and the pleading 
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just prior to trial, and thus increase the already numerous 
issues before the court, which thoroughly confused the 
jury. 'Jibe parties' rights should have been determined as 
they existed at the time of the eommencenient of the suit 
as between the parties. Defendants top filed plaintiffs' 
Drake No. 3 after suit commenced and pending trial and 
with full and actual knowledge of the existence and locartion 
of the said claim of plaintiffs. 
The court erred in refusing plaintiffs' motion to in-
clude as an issue of the physical location of Black Dragon 
No. 5 claim which bore directly on the validity of defend-
ants' claim Cinder Crater No. 14. The evidence conclu-
sively proved that Black Dragon No. 5 and plaintiffs' Drake 
No. 1 were one and the same location; that in fact plain-
tiffs used the original monument of Black Dragon No. 5 
in the location of Drake No. 1. That as a result, defend-
ants' Cinder Crater No. 14 was invalid at the time plain-
tiffs located Drake No.1, for the reason that Black Dragon 
No.5 was in force and effect at the time C"mder Crater No. 
14 was located. 
The court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the 
sufficiency of the labor performed by plaintiffs on Red 
Robin A during the spring of 1956, prior to the location of 
defendants' Red Hill No. 1, after commencement of the 
suit. That the uncontroverted evidence was to the effect 
that a minimum of $112.00 was done in spring of 1956 and 
in addition a mining operation on said claim; that plain-
tiffs discontinued further mining operations on Red Robin 
A just immediately prior to the location of defendants' Red 
Hill No. 1 by reason of an injunction to prevent plaintiffs 
from mining said Red Robin A and obtained by defendants. 
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Defendants are estopped from asserting their Red Hill No. 
1. 
The court erred in failing and refusing to allow Mr. 
Shelton's survey map into evidence to illustrate the physi-
cal condition of the daims in issue at the time survey was 
made. That said map refutes much of the testimony of 
defendants concerning assessment work allegedly performed 
by defendants. That said map would aid jury in determin-
ing the issues and clarify some of the testimony. That said 
map is certainly admisstble in evidence. 
The 'COurt erred in ruling that it is necessary under the 
Congressional Moratorium Act for the year 1947 that it 
is necessary to file Notice of Intention to Hold in order to 
prevent a forfeiture of the claim when no work is done. The 
Act is not mandatory for the reason that it provides for 
no forfeiture. The A:ct relieved the forfeiture provision for 
failure to do assessment work annually. The courts abhor 
a forfeiture. A Notice of Iintention to Hold was filed for 
Black Dragon No. 5, which was part of the amended Black 
Dragon No.6 for the time at issue, when defendants loca-
ted Cinder Crater No. 14. That the Notice of Intention to 
Hold for Black Dragon No. 5 was good for Black Dragon 
No.6. 
The court abused its discretion in failing to allow a 
view of the premises to the jury or the court itself certainly 
as to the issue presented to the jury as to the existence of 
a fictitious road built by defendants across Cinder Crater 
No. 13 and No. 14 in 1949. The view would certainly have 
clarified the existence or non-existence of the road, and sim-
plified the issues in this respect. 
The court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the 
vast preponderance of the evidence in favor of the plain-
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tiffs on the issues by reason of the strong testimony of 
many disinterested witnesses. 
the defendants wilfully misrepresented material facts 
as to assessment work on their claims Cinder Crater No. 
13 and No. 14. The record conclusively proves that Mr. 
Ralph Memmott has contradicted himself on numerous oc-
casions and wilfully misrepresented that he did not know 
of the existence or whereabouts of plaintiffs' claim Drake 
No. 3, when in fact Mr. Memmott had actual knowledge 
of its whereabouts and existence. The voice of justice and 
equity cries out that such a perjured testimony should not 
be allowed to prevail in a Court of Justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS S. TAYLOR, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
55 East Center St., 
Provo, Utah 
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